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Providing SIEM Systems with Self–Adaptation✩
Guillermo Suarez–Tangil1,∗, Esther Palomar1, Arturo Ribagorda1, Ivan
Sanz2
Abstract
Security information and event management (SIEM) is considered to be
a promising paradigm to reconcile traditional intrusion detection processes
along with most recent advances on artificial intelligence techniques in pro-
viding automatic and self–adaptive systems. However, classic management–
related flaws still persist, e.g. the fusion of large amounts of security events
reported from many heterogeneous systems, whilst novel intriguing challenges
arise specially when dealing with the adaptation to newly encountered and
multi–step attacks. In this article, we provide SIEM correlation with self–
adaptation capabilities to optimize and significantly reduce the intervention
of operators. In particular, our enhanced correlation engine automatically
learns and produces correlation rules based on the context for different types
of multi-step attacks using genetic programming. The context is considered
as the knowledge and reasoning, not only acquired by a human expert but
also inferred by our system, which assist in the identification and fusion of
events. In this regard, a number of artificial neural networks are trained
to classify events according to the corresponding context established for the
attack. Experimentation is conducted on a real deployment within OSSIM to
validate our proposal.
Keywords:
✩A Genetic–based Framework for an Adaptive Event Correlation
∗guillermo.suarez.tangil@uc3m.es
1Carlos III University of Madrid.
Avda. Universidad, 30, 38911, Madrid (Spain). E-mails: guillermo.suarez.tangil@uc3m.es,
{epalomar, arturo}@inf.uc3m.es
2Telefo´nica R & D.
C/ Don Ramon de la Cruz 84, 28006, Madrid (Spain).
E-mail: isahe@tid.es
Preprint submitted to Information Fusion January 16, 2013
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
SIEM, Event Correlation, Genetic Programming, Artificial Neural
networks, Adaptive system, Context-based Information Fusion
1. Introduction
Primarily conceived to centralize all the security information generated
by distributed data sources (named sensors) placed alongside a computer
network, Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems focus
on (a) normalizing sensory data (or collected events) in a common format,
(b) providing a rapid access to reported events, (c) performing an efficient
analysis of scattered events, and also (d) generating correlation alarms. These
two latter functionalities (c) and (d) represent important success factors for
SIEM, as they are concerned with the quality (or relevance) and not the
quantity of the reported events to assist operators for taking the appropriate
incident response decisions [1].
Currently, the role of information fusion in the computer security field
is being considered as a compelling solution to enhance and automate (c),
i.e., the analysis of security events [2]. In fact, fusion techniques can be
effectively applied to intrusion detection since they are proven to efficiently
deal with heterogeneity in three main aspects: when a number of different
data sources are involved, when these involved sensors are located at different
places, and when the information they process is represented possibly using
different formats [3].
1.1. Motivation
Hence, SIEM systems should place equal effort on guaranteeing an appro-
priate security information fusion as on assuring an efficient event correlation
analysis. However, despite their promising advantages, the following three
intriguing challenges emerge.
First, current SIEM systems are highly dependent on the configuration
of the multiple sensors deployed over the network. Multiple techniques have
been proposed so far to combine data derived from disparate sources in such
way that the inferred information and knowledge assist in the identification
of attacks. Most of them explore data fusion [4], data mining [5] and artificial
intelligence (AI) [6] algorithms in network monitoring and pattern recognition
processes [7].
Secondly, existing correlation engines still require operators to invest a
non–negligible effort to aggregate related alerts and also to select the most
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appropriate countermeasure [8]. Several techniques have used prerequisite
and consequence of attacks for determining threat pattern sequences, most
in the way of a series of alerts [9] [10].
Finally, emerging trends in SIEM systems are paying special attention
to the employment of automatic procedures for real time analysis of the se-
curity events. On one hand, few approaches have focused on the design of
intelligent intrusion detection systems (IDSs) capable of autonomous learn-
ing to incorporate new knowledge from previously suffered attacks [11]. On
the other hand, by introducing self-learning and adaptation into event cor-
relation, SIEM systems would be provided with an autonomous up-to-date
knowledge on attacks specially focused on preventing zero–day attacks from
any further damage [12]. Moreover, an intelligent correlation engine would
be devoted to recognize related events from complex multi–step attacks. In
this regard, it is still an open issue to automatically recognize the relevant
events for a given attack. To encounter this challenge, we believe that a
simple relevancy metric for attacks is mainly determined by their contexts
(i.e., situational awareness [13]). Hence, in this work a context is considered
as the prior known knowledge which is used to assign an interpretation to
the sensory data, and resolve ambiguity upon the identification of multi–step
attacks. In other words, determining the context of a given attack facilitates
the extraction of the potential attack’s representations, i.e., most in the way
of a collection of events, from an holistic viewpoint.
1.2. Contribution
This article offers the following main findings contributing to any previous
related work as follows:
• We present a self-adaptive SIEM system which optimizes the corre-
lation process by applying AI techniques and includes the following
functionalities:
1. A context-based security information fusion subsystem, namely
CONTEXTUAL, classifies all the events collected by the SIEM
system by deploying artificial neural networks (ANNs—widely ap-
plied to classification processes [14] [15]). A number of ANNs are
trained to dynamically recognize and categorize events into attack
scenarios being supervised by the prior known knowledge embod-
ied in the context studied. More precisely, an ANN will establish
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the patterns containing type and number of events to represent a
given multi-step attack. The classification provided by CONTEX-
TUAL will assist the correlation engine to chain context-related
events.
2. An enhanced event correlation subsystem, namely GENIAL, gen-
erates efficient correlation directives by introducing Genetic Pro-
gramming (GP) into the SIEM correlation engine. GP is a ma-
chine learning technique inspired by biological evolution, and has
already been applied to intrusion detection approaches such as
those in [11][16][17]. Our GP implementation allows the correla-
tion engine to automatically learn and produce correlation rules
for different types of multi-step attacks so being able to relate
events to the specific attack context and also making the incident
response more efficient.
• Our system is designed to be self–adaptive mainly due to the fact that
inferred correlation data can evolve and then be used to detect a certain
type of attack.
• We carry out a real integration of our subsystems into OSSIM [18],
namely the de facto standard Open Source SIEM. Our experimenta-
tion proves the accuracy of the correlation directives generated by our
subsystems which successfully detect different attack scenarios, such as
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, the main
background found in the literature is outlined. We introduce a brief overview
of our system together with its building blocks in Section 3. In Section 4 and
Section 5, the two subsystems are described in detail. In Section 6, our
proposal is deployed and analyzed in a real networking environment, and
finally, some conclusions are established in Section 7.
2. Related Work
Several SIEM software products have been recently developed to provide
essential intelligence in order to reach important associated properties such
as flexibility, adaptability, pattern recognition and efficiency. For example,
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ArcSight [19], RSA enVision [20], Sensage [21], HP CLW [22], Novell IBM
[23], LogLogic [24], netForensics [25], Bitacora [26], and OSSIM [18] are some
of the multi-layered security frameworks presented so far which establish
their own architecture and deployment options (we refer the interested reader
to [27] for an excellent evaluation of current SIEM products). However,
in general, a SIEM system involves these four main disciplines: detection,
storage, processing, and correlation and intelligence.
Reasonable intrusion detection practices rely on IDSs [28] and event log
analysis systems [29][30]. However, these techniques are not enough to detect
complex distributed attacks when used separately. For instance, depending
on where the IDS is placed it will detect some behaviors and skip others.
Two different approaches have been proposed to address it: 1) a central-
ized integration of the events reported as a whole [31][32], and 2) distributed
multi–agents systems [33][34]. Interested readers can find an excellent sur-
vey on collaboration–based IDSs in [35]. Thus, different AI techniques have
been applied to optimize intrusion detection aimed at dealing with persis-
tent disadvantages such as (i) the volume of alerts per day generated from
different sources, (ii) a high false–positive rates, and (iii) the inefficiency to
discover novel attack scenarios [36]. In particular, Expert Systems [37], Data
Mining [38][39], Statistical Analysis [40], Neural Networks [6][7][15][41], Ma-
chine Learning [34][42], Genetic Algorithms [43][44], and Artificial Immune
systems [45] are the most representative AI–based approaches.
Regarding storage and processing processes, early data aggregation schemes
[8][46][47] and current data fusion techniques [48][49] are conceived as a pal-
liative for the critical management of heterogeneous (in data and location)
events generated in bulk.
On the other hand, event correlation has been extensively addressed in
difference domains such as network fault diagnostic [50], sensor networks [51]
and attack detection [10] by applying multiple strategies. Recently, a strong
conception exists towards the effectiveness of the correlation process when
considering a centralized strategy [52]. Basically, the correlation engine infers
extra information from the events finding out connections between them [53].
Principal objectives range from reducing the large number of alerts reported
to identify multi–step attack scenarios, and also to identify new attack sig-
natures. This latter objective is perhaps the greatest challenge as attacks are
continuously evolving. However, the intelligent extraction of correlation rules
still deals with runtime overheads in terms of computational power and mem-
ory consumption imposed by the application of AI techniques. In particular,
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recent approaches to provide the correlation process with automatization are
mainly based on the following techniques1: (1) Similarity–based Clustering
organizes related events into attack groups according to a degree of similarity
[39], (2) Aggregation based on pre–defined attack scenarios performs corre-
lation by matching alerts up with patterns specified by operators or learned
through training datasets [8], and (3) Pre–requisites/Consequences syntaxis
is used to define the necessary conditions that must exist for a certain at-
tack to be successful, as well as the conditions that may exist after a specific
attack has occurred [9].
In this work we focus on optimizing event correlation from a bio-inspired
viewpoint. More specifically, genetic algorithms (GA) and genetic program-
ming (GP) have already been applied to either generate intrusion detection
rules for IDS [16][54] or to classify attacks [17][43]. Our proposal scrutinizes
the combined use of neural networks and GP to optimize the event correlation
process as well as presenting a holistic framework to efficiently apply such AI
techniques. Furthermore, the experiments and evaluations conducted in this
work are performed on a real network deployment, with real traffic. We also
provide an informal comparison of the goodness of our approach with some
other related works.
3. Overview of Our System
In this section, we provide a brief summary of the main subsystems,
namely CONTEXTUAL and GENIAL, and other important characteristics
that our system holds.
System Input: Events. Our system is deployed on an open source
SIEM system published under GLP license, namely OSSIM. As depicted in
Figure 1, our system receives sensory data or events from a number of sources
deployed within a OSSIM–monitored environment. We assume that sensors
are well–configured and report the encountered events to the SIEM system in
real–time. It is also assumed in our model that events are reported containing
a description of the problem that caused each security event. Traditionally,
such events are compiled and stored in bulk by the SIEM system for a further
analysis which in turn promises near real-time alerts to some extent. Our
1We further elaborate on these techniques in Section 6 in order to discuss about our
approach’s goodness.
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Figure 1: Our system in a nutshell.
enhancement introduces the ability to consolidate such sensory data in an
efficient and automatic manner.
Security Information Fusion: CONTEXTUAL Subsystem. Events
are classified by CONTEXTUAL, i.e., an ANN and context–based security
information fusion subsystem, which uses a series of previously defined tags.
Basically, such tags are previously extracted by an experienced human op-
erator with a good comprehension of each context, i.e., the concrete type
and number of events occurred when a certain attack is launched. More
precisely, the Neural Network Tags database specifies a series of labels or
keywords and it is used by the Pattern Generation Module to define the pat-
terns of a given attack scenario or context. Extracted patterns are stored in
the Neural Network Knowledge Base.
In order to such a classification occurs adaptably, a number of ANNs is
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deployed for each context defined. Received events which fit in with any
extracted pattern will comprise the subset of events called Positive Events.
Event Correlation: GENIAL Subsystem. The aforementioned sub-
set resulting from CONTEXTUAL contributes to produce an adaptive event
correlation subsystem namely GENIAL which is based on GP. Thus, GE-
NIAL receives the sensory data or events especially preprocessed and fused
by CONTEXTUAL. In particular, the classification of positive and negative
samples assists in the generation of a population of genetic individuals on
which GENIAL executes a genetic algorithm. An individual chains together
events based on their relevant attributes which strongly rely on the context
being examined as well as on the characteristics of the networking environ-
ment. Note that individuals are candidate solutions in our genetic program
and will represent correlation directives in our domain. For several rounds
or generations, evaluation and breeding procedures are therefore performed
on a number of individuals towards producing the best individual.
System Output: Correlation Directive. The best Individual pro-
duced during the execution of our genetic algorithm is selected and exported
to the OSSIM correlation engine as a Correlation Rule using OSSIM’s native
syntax.
Since our proposal has been designed minimizing dependencies with the
SIEM system, the only requirement to be satisfied is database availability.
Therefore, our subsystems have access to the database where the SIEM sys-
tem centralizes the reported events. In fact, our system uses sensory data
as input and outputs SIEM–native event correlation rules targeting specific
multi–step attacks. Note that experimentation focuses on analyzing com-
plex distributed attacks such as DDoS and web-scans dissemination by using
botnets, worms, trojans and virus, to name a few.
4. CONTEXTUAL: Context–based Security Information Fusion
Subsystem
In this section, we introduce CONTEXTUAL, an adaptive security in-
formation fusion subsystem based on ANNs which is devoted to classify the
security events into different types of attacks. The context plays an essential
role here since it represents the knowledge defined by the expert and used
during the ANNs’ configuration.
This subsystem consists of the following phases:
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1. Tag definition and context representation. A data association
process is performed by a static identification of groups of related events
as described in Section 4.1.
2. Prior knowledge injection and ANN deployments. The training
and deployment of a collection of ANNs (described in Section 4.2) opti-
mize the classification of unknown events into the categories extracted
during the phase above.
4.1. Tag Definition and Context Representation
Current SIEM correlation engines are intent on recognizing malicious ac-
tivity by identifying the existing associations amongst events. In this regard,
the common practice is to employ reference numbers for defining types of
events and the sensing sources which reported them. More precisely, sen-
sors log the result of those associations in different formats but containing
similar information extracted from the suspicious packet: source and destina-
tion’s IP addresses and ports, protocols, timestamp, sensor’s ID, or event ID
defining the suspicious activity, to name a few. As a result, correlation rules
highly depend on sensors’ configuration and any change on this configuration
leads to revisiting every rule. To encounter this problem, CONTEXTUAL is
sensor-independent as received events are classified into a series of keywords,
namely tags, which are extracted from the event logs towards an automatic
recognition of event types.
Thus, on one hand, a database called Neural Network Tags is created by
the human expert comprising the following:
Definition 1. A tag tj ∈ T is a keyword which captures the nature of a
given event description. Each event is therefore defined more precisely by its
tag.
Thus, tags are extracted based on the experience of the human expert and
according to (i) the characteristics of the environment, and also (ii) new in-
coming events in the SIEM system. For the sake of clarity, in our experimen-
tal testbed, any web–based intrusion pattern may be totally characterized as
a particular set of tags which may contain any of the following: web access,
web attempt, web attack, web command, web directory, web password, web crosssite,
web httpinspect, web configuration, web administ–ration, web xss, web injection,
web overflow, web scan, web error, web auth, web dos, web highseverity, web response,
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Table 1: A sample of tags extracted during this work experimentation.
Description Tags
web access, attempt, attack , command, directory, password,
crossite, httpinspect, php, administration, script, scan,
overflow, error, auth, DoS, highseverity, response, iis
configuration conf, disclos, reveal
sql sql, oracle, odbc
injection injection
virus virus, trojan, ware, spam, bot, infection, propagation,
virexploit, irc, telnet, dtelnet, ftp, dftp, smb, dsmb,
vir request, vir response, trojan blacklist, ware blacklist
scan netscan, portscan
crosssite crosssite, xss
as shown in Table 1. Data mining tools can be applied to minimize the in-
tervention of the expert in this stage.
On the other hand, a human expert is also needed to specify the concrete
number and type of the events representing each context. In that regard,
CONTEXTUAL generates a series of patterns defined as follows:
Definition 2. A pattern p defines an histogram of occurrences for each tag
tj ∈ T which all together determine a certain intrusive or misuse activity
registered by a SIEM–monitored environment.
In other words, the frequency f(tj) of tag tj in each histogram represents
the number n = f(tj) = |Ej| of the security events {E1, E2, · · · , En} ∈ Ej
tagged accordingly with tj in pattern p, therefore,
Definition 3. A context representation Ci is defined by a total number m of
patterns pim ∈ P which consists of all the events that the attack i involves:
pim = {|E1|, |E2|, · · · , |Ej|}| ∀ Ej ∃ tj ∈ T
Table 2 represents an excerpt of a number of patterns in P which are
generated in the phase below.
4.2. Prior Knowledge Injection and ANN Deployments
CONTEXTUAL implements a series of ANNs which are defined to repre-
sent a particular attack so categorizing different types of security threats. In
that regard, a human expert introduces the prior knowledge into the Neural
10
Table 2: Initial set of patterns describing an attack scenario for a given context Cweb.
Each pattern pwebm in each row represents the number of events with tag tj and serves as
input for each ANN. Here fm(taccess) = {0, 0, 44, ...} ∀m = {1, 2, 3, ...}.
f(taccess) f(tattempt) f(tattack) f(tcmd) f(tdir) f(txss) f(tpwd) f(tauth) f(tj) out
pweb
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
pweb
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... no
pweb
3
44 31 13 0 0 1 0 ... 7 yes
pweb
4
463 0 0 1 462 0 ... 462 0 yes
pweb
5
50 19 8 0 0 ... 0 8 20 yes
pweb
6
50 30 14 0 ... 4 0 3 4 yes
pweb
7
563 0 0 ... 0 563 563 0 0 yes
pweb
8
64 49 ... 0 0 1 0 4 0 yes
pweb
9
653 ... 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 no
pwebm ... 6 649 0 0 1 0 0 1 no
Network Knowledge Base which keeps track of the identified patterns. Thus,
such patterns attend to configure the ANNs, i.e., weights and neuron connec-
tions, which in turn indicate whether a collection of events (not necessarily
in order) can be classified into a given context representation (see Figure 2).
ANNs are implemented using the Weka [55] library.
Hence, we deploy a number of multilayer feedforward ANNs which learn
from a limited training set, i.e., the Neural Network Knowledge Base by
executing the phases below:
1. Pattern Generation Module. Human expertise on a context is applied
towards the specification of P, building the model to relate a series of
events to a concrete instance of a given multi-step attack Ci. Hence,
a total number m of patterns pim ∈ P is extracted and stored into the
Neural Network Knowledge Base for each Ci.
In order to create a training set for Ci as in Table 2, this process requires
the identification of positive (the yes–taught set) as well as negative
samples (the no–taught set). Samples are then chosen such that rep-
resenting the attack scenario and its variations.
Each ANN is trained oﬄine to produce the output such that satisfying
Equation 1 for each pim ∈ P of Ci:
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Figure 2: Each ANN is a multilayer perceptron which maps a set of input patterns (Knowl-
edge Base) with a number of incoming events. Let εk denotes a neuron and wj the asso-
ciated weight of each neuron connection. Function fm(tj) returns the number of events
tagged with tj ∈ T for each tag encountered in Ci and for each pattern in pim ∈ P . Each
ANN produces an appropriate output y (see Eq. 1) for each Ci previously defined.
y = σpim(ε) =
{
yes if ε ≥ h
no if ε < h
where ε =
k∑
i=1
wi ·
|T |∑
j=1
wji · fm(tj) (1)
where h denotes the threshold generated and adjusted by each ANN to
achieved the expected classification for inputs, and fm(tj) returns the
total number of events tagged using tj for a given pattern pim of the con-
text Ci. We run our experiments for a number of neurons which started
small and kept increasing until satisfactory results were obtained.
Each ANN learns the best configuration (the reliability ratio is 100%)
in order to satisfy the defined context representation. For example, re-
ceiving a number of 15 events tagged as xss and 12 web access should
match the crosssite scripting context Cxss. By contrast, considering
a number of 30 events tagged as web error, an 2 web auth does not
represent any threat.
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2. ANN Deployment. Once trained, the ANNs are deployed in a real
networking environment. Thus, the ANNs receive as inputs real-time
events and classify them with the corresponding context label, e.g.
DDoS. Moreover, new encountered patterns will be dynamically added
on the Neural Network Knowledge Base which makes false positives to
decrease rapidly.
Participation of a human expert is also required at the end of this
phase to carefully examine the knowledge base of Positive Events, PE .
This database consists of the events classified as any of the context
representations analyzed by the ANNs deployed. In particular, the
expert should inspect the patterns and reconfigure the ANNs, if needed,
in terms of the following parameters: momentum, learning rate, and
training time (see Weka [55] library for details on these parameters).
This process represents the so-called event consolidation to a central
database which is the output of CONTEXTUAL.
A note on the consolidation of the new encountered patterns.
Preprocessed events in PE are correlated afterwards, most in the way of an
information fusion system does. In our experimentation we test CONTEX-
TUAL output on both, the present correlation engine of OSSIM by default
and also on the enhanced correlation subsystem using GP namely GENIAL
(which is presented in the section below). It is interesting to note that CON-
TEXTUAL performance gets better results if GENIAL is executed straight
after. By contrast, OSSIM’s correlator is not efficient interpreting CONTEX-
TUAL output even though this output is presented in the correct format.
5. GENIAL: GP–based Event Correlation Subsystem
In this section, we apply GP to enhance the OSSIM’s correlation engine
aimed at automatically generating event correlation directives. A complete
set of directives is an XML representation of security events as described
further below. Basically, we implement GENIAL based on a Java–based
Evolutionary Computation (ECJ) Research System which comprises the fol-
lowing phases (see also Algorithm 1):
1. Preprocessing. ANNs’ outputs create a training set to guide a su-
pervised learning of the behavior of a given context representation Ci
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and then assist correlation in automatically inferring the potential re-
lationships amongst events. Important piece of correlation information
is inferred in this stage by inspecting the events received.
2. Representation of individuals. An individual represents a correla-
tion directive as a combination of rules connected via operator functions
such as AND, OR, etc. Rules are written as lists of conditions that
should be satisfied between event log information (or characteristics of
the events received) and a series of rule attributes described below.
3. Initialization of the population. A population consists of a forest
of individuals (with a tree–based representation). The population is
randomly initialized according to the inferred information extracted
during the Preprocessing phase.
4. Evaluation of individuals. During a sequence of generations, indi-
viduals are evaluated using the training set created in the Preprocessing
stage.
5. Breeding. By applying crossover and mutation operators on individu-
als, new individuals (offprints of the previous generation) are generated.
Subsections below describe these phases in detail.
5.1. Preprocessing
The purpose of preprocessing the events extracted from the ANNs is
twofold. First, we need to construct a training set which supervises the eval-
uation of individuals as described in Section 5.4. Secondly, preprocessing
assists us in inferring specific correlation information for the context repre-
sentations (or simply context hereafter) identified.
On one hand, we have two different types of events, namely
Definition 4. A positive context compiles the set of events that were classi-
fied as “positive” by CONTEXTUAL’s set PE .
Definition 5. A negative context compiles the set of events that were classi-
fied as “negative” by CONTEXTUAL and also were obtained randomly from
other contexts.
Hence, context specifications, i.e. outcomes of each ANN, are all labelled
as Positive and belong to the set PE in Algorithm 1–line 1. On the con-
trary, unclassified events form the set of Negative Contexts denoted as N
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in Algorithm 1–line 2. However, both collections will produce the training
set which is generated by splitting them into several subsets of N–grams [56]
called Registers (and denoted by R in Algorithm 1–line 3). Thus, we have
Definition 6. A register ri ∈ R represents a sequence of k events, and
are produced by different combinations between both Positive, PE , and/or
Negative, N , contexts, i.e., R = {r1, · · · , rn}s.t. ri ⊂ PE ∨N .
A Positive Register compiles Positive Contexts, i.e., ri = {E1, · · · , Ek}, k >
0, s.t.∀Ej ⊂ PE , whereas a Negative Register gathers together events from
N . Therefore, in this stage two files are generated to train a population of
events, namely
• A positive training set is formed by the collection of Tp positive regis-
ters.
• A negative training set consists of the total amount Tn of encountered
negative registers.
On the other hand, by inspecting event characteristics from positive con-
texts in PE we can infer very useful information for the correlation process,
especially for representing individuals in our domain. In particular, we have
identified a limited number of attributes extracted from the received events
which capture intrinsic event properties for the contexts performed in our
evaluations. Hence, a number of rules will be constructed in the following
stage of GENIAL which relate event characteristics to attributes so evalu-
ating if a certain condition is satisfied, as shown in Table 3. From our con-
ducted experiments, we define the following attributes of rules: name, type,
pluginid, pluginsid, addrfrom, addrto, portfrom, portto, protocol, reliability,
timeout, occurrence, sticky, sticky difference, condition, value, interval,
absolute, and reliability abs (for further details on these attributes refer to
[57] and [18]).
In this regard, events will be classified into categories according to the
attributes in common. Thus, we can organize events in categories as
Definition 7. A number of events are classified into the same category if
values of their event characteristics match up with the following attributes:
addrfrom, addrto, portto, pluginid, and pluginsid.
15
Table 3: Event characteristics used to identify correlations between positive–tagged con-
texts and attributes of a rule. We mark with a
√
when the attribute is applicable, and
with −− if no correlation is achieved.
Category
addrfrom addrto pluginid pluginsid portto portfrom protocol timeout
Number of
Events per
√
– – –√ √ √
–
√ √ √
–
– –
√
– – – –
Protocols
per
– –
√
– – – –
Time
Range
– – – – – – –
√
Max Slot
Time
– – – – – – –
√
Min Slot
Time
– – – – – – –
√
Apart from these attributes, the existing timing relationships between any
pair of consecutive events are also extracted from events’ timestamps in PE
to correlate temporal conditions (timeout).
5.2. Representation of the Individual
In this phase, we deal with the representation of candidate solutions to
our correlation problem which are represented by individuals in a population,
i.e., in the form of correlation directives. A correlation directive is an XML
data structure with the following schema:
• Directive → (Rule). Directive consists of an unique Rule. Attributes
of directives are an identifier, a name and a priority.
• Rule → (Rules). Rule comprises at least one rule in Rules.
• Rules → (Rule+). Element Rules mandatorily has one or more occur-
rences of Rule. There are no specific attributes for this element.
GP defines individuals as trees where intermediate nodes (or simply nodes)
have an operator function and every leaf node has an attribute of our model.
In the experiments conducted, the operator for non terminal nodes executes
operators like AND and OR, whilst attributes for terminal nodes consist of
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OSSIM rules. For example, put simply an individual such the expression:
rulex AND (ruley OR rulez). However, individuals should meet the follow-
ing constraints according to the aforementioned XML schema [18]: (i) nodes
have at most two “sibling” nodes, (ii) nodes’ children will be either leaves
(i.e. rules) or AND operations, and (iii) the root of each individual cannot
be an OR operation.
Now, to establish the best configuration for individuals in our domain,
we have organized rule attributes into two different types, as follows:
• A number of rule attributes, which are referred as Relevant attributes,
are applied to find equivalences between events.
In particular, main relevant attributes for events are source and destina-
tion addresses (addrfrom, addrto), their corresponding ports (portfrom,
portto), the sensor identifiers (i.e. pluginid and pluginsid), and their
timestamp when detected.
• A number of additional attributes, which are called Advanced attributes,
are applied to the evaluation process.
Attributes of this type are priority, reliability, occurrence and timeout.
Hence, Relevant attributes are those which identify sensory data from
both the attacker and the victim viewpoints. However, Advanced attributes
comprise information regarding the probability of success of a given attack
and the importance of the asset within the organization environment. There-
fore, Advanced attributes depend on the organization network, whereas Rel-
evant attributes rely on the particular attack context.
5.3. Initialization of the Population
ECJ development toolkit provides a tree building method, namely the
class HalfBuilder, which implements a complete procedure to initialize a
population of individuals. In this process, nodes are inserted into the tree ac-
cording to a certain probability which determines how much the tree spreads
itself.
Additionally, ECJ provides a friendly parameter file to specify all the
aforementioned constraints. However, Advanced attributes intrinsically de-
pend on the length and width of the generated trees, and also on the in-
formation of the Relevant attributes which is randomly filled out. Thus, we
modify the ECJ initial population builder (as described in Algorithm 1–lines
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Figure 3: Evaluation of register r1 over a given individual.
4–7) in order to revisit the generated tree by performing the following two
phases:
1. A new method is added aimed at counting the total number of leaves
which match up with pluginid and pluginsid values for each tree branch.
2. A new method is included which uniformly distributes the attributes
timeout, reliability and the total number of occurrences stored in the
positive training set along the tree branches.
3. An heuristic to aggregate events is also added based on the source
and destination IP addresses and ports information contained within
events. Basically, a tuple of events can be aggregated in a N : M
topology manner, where N is the number of different sources and M
represents destinations. Thus, we generate different rules according
to the following types of interaction: (i) unidirectional (aggregating
events to/from a given computer), (ii) bidirectional (putting together
events exchanged between a given pair of computers), and (iii) Multi–
directional (aggregating in terms of a different attribute as there is no
correlation between IP addresses). This heuristic facilitates population
building and systematically categorizes correlations between events ac-
cording to the way events are aggregated.
5.4. Evaluation of the Individuals
The process of evaluating individuals is supervised by the training sets as
follows. First, each individual is evaluated using both types of registers, i.e.,
positive and negative, previously generated (see details in Fig. 3). Basically,
trees are visited by applying pre-order traversal which recursively visits each
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node on the left and right subtrees from the root. In particular, nodes are
evaluated in the following terms:
• Leaf nodes are evaluated according to the events in each register. In this
regard, event characteristics are compared with the Relevant attributes
of the rule being evaluated. Additionally, we seek for potential corre-
spondences between each rule and the number occurrence of events in
chronological order.
• Nodes are evaluated by applying AND and OR functions to the values
produced in the evaluation of their children.
Once individuals have been iterated, they will be classified into:
• A positive individual returns true as a positive register matches up; or
• A negative individual occurs when a negative register evaluated over
the individual returns false.
Thus, we make the population evolve for a series of generations in which a
fitness function is evaluated on every individual (Algorithm 1–line 10). The
fitness function is used for measuring and ranking every individual based
on its quality to represent a candidate solution. Since our objective is to
maximize the number of positive classifications over positive registers as well
as to maximize the number of negative classifications over negative registers,
we have defined the fitness function as
fitness = 1− (P +N)× P
(Tp + Tn)× Tp (2)
where PN and N are the number of positive and negative classifications
respectively, and Tp and Tn are the total number of positive and negative
registers evaluated. Fitness values can therefore take any nonnegative value
between [0.0, 1.0], being 0.0 the value for best individuals and 1.0 for the
worst ones. Consequently, a selection of individuals is made during each
generation based on their fitness, as shown in Algorithm 1–line 11. To sum
up, the higher the number of negative/positive classifications, the better the
individuals’ fitness is.
Important remarks. To define the appropriate fitness function is al-
ways hard and depends on the problem domain. For instance, such a function
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Algorithm 1 Proposed algorithm for GENIAL
1: PE = {Collection of Positive Events}
2: N = {Collection of Negative Events}
3: R = { r1, r2, r3, ..., rn/ri ⊂ P ∨N}
4: Individuals ← {Initialization of the population}
5: Individuals ← {Initialization of the Relevant attributes}
6: Individuals ← {Initialization of the Advanced attributes}
7: directive = null; bestindividual = null; bestfitness = 1
8: for all Generations do
9: for all i in Individuals do
10: fitness = eval(i, R) as in Eq. 2
11: if fitness is better than bestfitness then
12: bestfitness = fitness
13: bestindividual = i
14: end if
15: end for
16: Individuals ← {Breed(Individuals) ⋃ bestindividual }
17: end for
18: directive =ToOssimSintax(bestindividual)
19: return directive
is generally determined by trial–and–error. We run our experiments consid-
ering different fitness functions which gave us worse results. For example, we
have analyzed the function based on the risk assessment present in OSSIM
by default:
Risk =
(Asset · Priority ·Reliability)
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(3)
Function in Eq. 3 follows an heuristic algorithm which establishes a risk that
the monitored asset might undergo for a specific thread (i.e. the reliability
of the possible attack) and it is also based on the directive priority. This
function has been proven to report false positives and to ignore relevant
characteristics presented in several well-known datasets.
5.5. Breeding Process
In this phase, the population is evolved by the recombination of individ-
uals by applying selection, crossover and mutation operators. A tournament
selection is performed so that the best individuals will survive in the next
generation (Algorithm 1–line 16). A new set of individuals are therefore
generated by forcing mutation on the selected individuals.
20
We have modified the ECJ method called MultiBreedingPipeline to
revisit the generated tree as advanced attributes are modified in each gener-
ation.
Finally, the best individual, i.e., the correlation directive which optimally
fuses the events related to a specific context, is exported from GENIAL to
OSSIM using its native syntax (Algorithm 1–line 18).
6. Experimental Evaluation of our System
We performed several experiments in order to evaluate our genetic–based
framework for a self-adaptive event correlation.
6.1. Experimental Testbed
A botnet (Fig. 4) has been implemented to disseminate and launch a
number of attacks. Several zombies distribute malware from the master to
all the bots. In particular, two types of DDoS are launched in our testbed:
HTTPFlood and ICMPFlood. We create 30 zombies and 10000 floods per
zombie. Generated events are used by our framework to create the training
set, as described in Section 5. Once the best individual is reached, it is parsed
according to the correlation engine syntax, exported to the OSSIM, and
re–evaluated afterwards. OSSIM is deployed into the testbed along with a
number of both types, host and network–based, of intrusion detection agents
such as Snare [58] and Snort [59].
6.1.1. DDoS Attacks Experiment: HTTPFlood and ICMPFlood
We analyze and compare correlation directives generated by OSSIM (ver-
sions 1.0.6 and 2.0.1) correlation engine with those produced by our frame-
work for the detection of HTTPFlood and ICMPFlood attack contexts.
OSSIM correlation directives by default. On one hand, experiments show that
OSSIM v1.0.6 is proven to be non-efficient in detecting the HTTPFlood at-
tack. In fact, sensors not only provide useless but also erroneous events as
they report a “port scan” classification. The latter mistake is possibly de-
rived from the web server while processing numerous bot’s requests. More
precisely, for each HTTP request, the server opens a new port, so behaving
similar to a port scan. On the other hand, OSSIM v2.0.1 enhances the con-
figuration of Snort sensors triggering the following event: “COMMUNITY
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Figure 4: Experimental testbed where a DDoS attack is launched against a monitored
server by a botnet deployment. Events generated are exported and used as the training
set.
SIP TCP/IP message flooding directed to SIP proxy”, and the following du-
plicated alert: “Strange host behaviour on SRC IP”. However, OSSIM can-
not produce a directive that correlates the reported sensory data and the
web-server’s log. Similarly, there is no alert reported when launching the
ICMPFlood attack.
Directives produced by our framework. We train our genetic framework to
detect the same attack. A total of 20,480 individuals were randomly gen-
erated and evaluated. The best individual showed a fitness of 0.250. This
individual presented a number of 22 hits for the positive training set out
of 27 (81%) and a number of 122 hits for the negative training set out of
122 (100%). After including the produced directive and executing the attack
again, OSSIM was capable of successfully detecting the DDoS attack with-
out human intervention. Additionally, the attack was detected within the 10
seconds soon after, whilst the DDoS alert showed the maximum rate of risk.
Furthermore, only one alert was triggered whereas there exists more than
one alert for the same attack in the default correlation. On the contrary,
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Table 4: Evaluation of several complex–to–detect attacks using Metasploit penetration
toolkit.
Exploit Type Run Time Fitness
ms08 067 netapi SMB Exploit 10 s. 9.76
amaya bdo Browser Exploit 11 s. 8.86
ms 06 57 webview setslice Browser Exploit 8 s 8.76
ms06 067 keyframe Browser Exploit 9 s 8.71
adobe getico Browser Exploit 13 s 9.30
msvidctl mpgeg2 Browser Exploit 51 s 7.95
ms10 002 aurora Browser Exploit 10 s 8.71
there is no alert triggered during normal operation of the web server.
We refer interested readers to Appendix A.1 for further details on the
experimentation results. In particular, Table A.7 and Table A.8 show results
for the correlation of HTTPFlood and ICMPFlood attacks respectively in
the scenarios above.
6.1.2. Metasploit Penetration Experiments
Metasploit framework (MSF) [60] is an open–source tool–kit, which pro-
vides a framework to identify security issues, verify vulnerability mitigation,
and manage expert–driven security assessments. We include an evaluation of
our system considering the attacks occurred within our testbed when MSF
is used to attack a vulnerable victim. A number of penetration tests based
on MSF are presented and described in Appendix A.2 and Table A.9.
OSSIM correlation directives by default. OSSIM configuration by default is
not capable of processing incoming events from the attacks executed. Each
sensor is configured to recognize specific network packets or log files from the
exploits. Thus, sensors are reporting several de–correlated events for each
exploit.
Directives produced by our framework. We train our genetic framework to
detect the same MSF attacks. After inserting the resultant directives and
executing the attacks again, the OSSIM system can successfully detect each
of the exploits shown in Table 4. It is worthy of mentioning that attacks are
detected while they are still occurring as well as no single false positive is
detected.
23
6.2. Real Deployment
Our enhanced SIEM system is deployed in a large–scale network infras-
tructure in production. Both CONTEXTUAL and GENIAL subsystems
have been integrated into an OSSIM instance located at a vantage point in
the network. Additionally, various agents have been placed all around the
intra–building local area network links as well as at end–user workstations
and other system services such as web, proxy, and backup servers.
Results of the observations made during a period of a week are then com-
mented and discussed. More specifically, a total of 15.000 bulky and complex
flow of different events per second has been processed on average. Given the
complexity of the network topology and considering the environment, it is
crucial to tailor the monitoring system according to the (i) different secu-
rity needs and capabilities, (ii) different assets and valuables to protect, and
(iii) different threat scenarios against the networked systems. In this regard,
OSSIM offers a number of open source tools to evaluate each of the assets
deployed in the environment.
Analysis of the observations. To determine the efficiency and accuracy of our
framework, two scenarios have been considered. First, a stand–alone OSSIM
instance was used for security monitoring. Secondly, our framework was
deployed in a separate instance in line with the first scenario. Measurement
has been tackled during a period of 11 days. Figure 5 shows the total number
of correlation alerts reported for each scenario. During those days, observed
events were manually inspected whereas reported alerts were classified into
(i) new or zero–day attacks (ZDA), (ii) true positive (TP), and (iii) false
negative (FN). ZDAs are those intrusions that were only discovered by our
framework in the second scenario. TPs are those intrusions that triggered an
alert, whereas FNs are those alarms that were triggered due to no intrusion
in both scenarios. We discovered that, on one hand, our framework detected
a number of ZDAs which were not detected by the stand–alone instance of
OSSIM. Table 5 enumerates intrusions discovered and their evolving features
as well. On the other hand, 53 out of 61 (86.89%) TP alerts were only
reported by our framework. Whereas, the total number of FNs reported
in both scenarios, just 30 out of 340 alarms (8.82%) were reported by our
framework.
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Figure 5: Alerts observed in the two scenarios deployed: (i) stand–alone OSSIM instance,
and (ii) our CONTEXTUAL and GENIAL framework integrated into OSSIM.
6.3. Discussion
In this section, we present a qualitative discussion on the goodness of
our framework in terms of the observations obtained during the conducted
empirical analysis. In that regard, we compare our approach with the most
relevant related works presented so far. Table 6 summarizes our findings
during this qualitative analysis mainly focuses on examining the level of
human participation and adaptability of the approaches.
In particular, we find in [8] the least efficient framework in which neither
adaptation nor intelligence are introduced into the aggregation and correla-
tion processes. Thus, human involvement is high.
Automatic correlation approaches appear on the basis of prerequisites
and consequences such as [9]. Although their experiments demonstrated the
potential of their framework, it still requires an extensive and significant
effort identifying both, prerequisites and consequences, for each possible sce-
nario. By contrast, our proposal optimizes this task by allowing the expert
to introduce his/her prior knowledge of the context (i.e., a generic/specific
misuse activity) into the reported sensory data for an efficient classification
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Table 5: Evaluation of several multi–step attacks reported by our framework in a real
networking environment.
Categories Run Time Fitness
Botnet anomaly 4 10 sec. 9,5
Bredavi trojan A 5 19 sec. 7,57
Bredavi trojan B 6 25 sec. 7,91
Conficker solaris 14 36 sec. 7,95
Dell remote access 17 42 sec. 7,95
Brute force SSHD 18 18 sec. 7,75
Port scan 24 123 sec. 7,94
Spyware 31 848 sec. 8,06
Telnet worm 56 85 sec. 8,09
Web scan 57 51 sec. 7,95
and fusion of related events.
J. Zhu et al. [66] presented probabilistic alert correlation based on the
extraction of attack strategies from a static training file. Their model applies
machine–learning techniques but is not able to automatically relate events
to the corresponding attack in real–time. Thus, similar algorithms such as
[62], [63], [64], and [61] are not effective for real deployments.
Multi-step intrusions started to be addressed from different perspectives.
For example, the approach proposed by J. Zhou et al. in [67] studied the logi-
cal relationships between events of multistage attacks aimed at automatically
deriving what they called inference rules to define such relationship. Authors
assume that events are previously classified into capabilities (a knowledge
base that identifies variants of the same attack). Similarly, R. Sadoddin et
al. [70] proposed the application of data mining techniques to perform fre-
quency analysis and pattern structure extraction on a real–time framework.
However, both approaches assume that the sensors do not report FN alarms,
but considering that all extracted correlations will be effective. Based on our
experiments, such assumptions have proven to be unrealistic and invalid for
ZDA detection. Furthermore, a major drawback for such a frequency–based
learning leads to new correlations can only be discovered if the underlying
attack is launched repeatedly.
Human intervention is decreased as some sort of context-based knowledge
is considered. For example, C.V. Zhou et al. [68] use a decentralized, multi–
dimensional alert correlation algorithm which first integrates events locally at
each sensor into eight different types of clusters with similar attack topology.
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Table 6: Qualitative comparison with respect to related works.
Approach
Human Automatic Automatic
Intervention Classification Correlation
Aggregation [8] High No No
Pre–requisites/Consequences [9] High No Yes
Scenarios generation [61] High Yes Yes
Objective–based correlation [62] High No Yes
Similarity–based correlation [63] High No Yes
Attack graph correlation [64] High No Yes
Attack graph correlation [65] Low No Yes
Probabilistic correlation [66] High No Yes
Inference–rules correlation [67] High No Yes
Multi–dimensional correlation [68] Medium Yes No
Similarity–based clustering [39] Medium Yes No
Attack graph correlation [69] Low Yes Yes
Our Approach Low Yes Yes
The proposed clustering is based on a pre–defined set of patterns so unknown
attack strategies could easily evade aggregation made locally. Furthermore,
N.O. Joshua et al. [39] also presented a clustering method to reduce the
sensory data reported. However, the classification method is limited as it
is trained using static datasets. On the contrary, our approach includes dy-
namic data feedback which evolves according to the context representations
occurred in the network.
Finally, L. Wang et al. [65] applied attack graphs (graphical representa-
tions of the existing interdependencies between vulnerabilities and connec-
tivity in the network) to correlate and hypothesize events generated from
both, known and unknown, attacks, and even to predict future alerts. From
their experimentation, attack graphs present better performance than other
machine learning-based approaches. Moreover, S.H. Ahmadinejad et al. [69]
extended Wang et al.’s work towards self-adapting over unknown attacks.
However, both proposals lack of robustness when unknown attacks present
high dissimilarity to the current knowledge base. In fact, experiments con-
ducted in [69] show correlations when partial graphs of the attacks (from
DARPA 2000 dataset) are presented, whilst our framework is able to cor-
relate ZDA attacks (i.e. when host vulnerabilities are not present in the
model).
In summary, our approach differs from the previous, so overcoming others’
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common drawbacks as:
• Adaptation is considered by design. Our framework is self-adaptive
in both processes, classifying sensory data based on attack contexts
as well as generating correlation rules. Moreover, it has been proven
that our system decreases the human intervention and prevents against
ZDAs.
• Efficiency is considered by design. Our framework has been proven
to be efficient and accurate when deployed in a real environment. In
fact, our system presents efficiency in the way of true positive rate is
increased whilst false positive rate decreases.
• Context-based knowledge is considered by design. AI–based approaches
presented so far in security information fusion domains do not explicitly
consider contextual information for correlation purposes, suffering from
the classical problem of generality in AI [71].
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, a cutting–edge scheme tackling the design of a self–adaptive
SIEM system is introduced. The novelty of our proposal falls on the adopted
approach which can be summarized in the following terms. From the point
of view of the optimized SIEM, the framework allows SIEM systems to au-
tomatically learn attack signatures based on contextual knowledge as well
as to automatically produce optimum correlation directives. Two main sub-
systems are therefore introduced: a context–based event classifier based on
ANNs, called CONTEXTUAL and, an enhanced SIEM correlation engine
based on GP, called GENIAL. From the point of view of the human operator,
our self–adaptive SIEM system considerably decreases the human supervi-
sion to some extent. Furthermore, we carried out a real integration of our
subsystems into a OSSIM–monitored environment to evaluate the goodness
and feasibility of our proposal.
Our future work is now focused on the following enhancements to the
proposed system especially within CONTEXTUAL, which includes:
• The application of clustering techniques on the extraction of tags which
will provide CONTEXTUAL with self-adaptation so eliminating the
expert intervention in that matter, and also
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• The application of filtering techniques during the compilation of rele-
vant events, e.g. by introducing honeypots.
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Appendix A. Simulation Results
Appendix A.1. DDoS Experiment
In this appendix, results of the simulation conducted in our testbed are
provided. In particular, two types of DDoS attacks were launched namely
HTTP flood and ICMP flood. Table A.7 and Table A.8 give details on the
results of the evaluations on our experimental testbed.
Appendix A.2. Metasploit Experiment
In this appendix, results of the penetration experiments conducted on
our testbed are provided. In particular, two isolated computers are deployed,
namely the victim and attacker computer. The victim is a vulnerable Win-
dows XP configured with Snare Event Log Agent [58], and events are reported
to the OSSIM v3 —located in the same network as the victim. On the other
hand, the attacker is configured with MSF v3, and it is located in a different
network than the victim. Victim’s vulnerabilities are chosen based on their
prevalence and exploit code availability to demonstrate the validity of our
framework. The attacker uses selected exploits to compromise the victim.
Table A.9 depicts the corresponding exploits.
For the sake of completeness, we include an excerpt of the events re-
ported when running MSF attacks. In particular, ms08 067 netapi exploit
comprises the following steps: (i) discovery phase, (ii) exploitation phase,
and (iii) payload–injection, as follows:
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Table A.7: HTTP Flood.
OSSIM
Version
Num.
Zombis
Type of Event
Num.
Events
Type of
Alert
Num.
Alerts
Risk
1.0.6
1
Spade: Non–live dest used 16 TCP Portscan
against Web
Server
5 5pam unix: authentication suc-
cessful
2
portscan: Open Port 396
5
Spade: Non–live dest used 1 TCP Portscan
against Web
Server
1 2pam unix: authentication suc-
cessful
1
portscan: Open Port 862
10
Spade: Non–live dest used 0 TCP Portscan
against Web
Server
1 5pam unix: authentication suc-
cessful
1
portscan: Open Port 526
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Spade: Non–live dest used 2 TCP Portscan
against Web
Server
14 5pam unix: authentication suc-
cessful
11
portscan: Open Port 61
2.1
1
snort: COMMUNITY SIP
TCP/IP message flooding di-
rected to SIP proxy
36
- - -
rrd threshold: ntop global
upTo64Pkts
1
p0f: OS Same 1
5
snort: COMMUNITY SIP
TCP/IP message flooding di-
rected to SIP proxy
195
- - -
rrd threshold: ntop global
upTo128Pkts
5
10
snort: COMMUNITY SIP
TCP/IP message flooding di-
rected to SIP proxy
462
Strange host
behaviour on
SRCIP
2 0rrd anomaly: ntop global
rrd threshold: ntop global
p0f: New OS 6
p0f: OS Same 6
Running ms08 067 netapi exploit, the following events are reported by the
sensors:
♦ [Discovery] Snort : port scan detected.
♦ [Exploitation] Snare: Logon Fail - Unknown user name or bad password.
♦ [Exploitation] Snare: The Windows Firewall has detected an application
listening for incoming traffic.
♦ [Exploitation] Snare: Account Used for Logon by.
♦ [Exploitation] Snort : SMB protocol negotiation.
♦ [Exploitation] Snort : NTLMSSP session with unauthenticated user.
♦ [Payload–infection] Snort : Meterpreter payload infection.
♦ [Payload–infection] Snare: A new process has been created.
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Table A.8: ICMP Flood.
OSSIM
Version
Num.
Zombis
Type of Event
Num.
Events
Type of
Alert
Num.
Alerts
Risk
1.0.6
1
Spade: Non-live dest used 10
TCP Portscan
against Web
Server
2 5
pam unix: authentication suc-
cessful
2
portscan: TCP Portscan 4
portscan: Open Port 1
Spade: Source used odd dest
port
1
5
Spade: Non–live dest used 18
TCP Portscan
against Web
Server
7 5
pam unix: authentication suc-
cessful
7
portscan: TCP Portscan 0
portscan: Open Port 16
Spade: Source used odd dest
port
3
10
Spade: Non–live dest used 21
TCP Portscan
against Web
Server
13 5
pam unix: authentication suc-
cessful
45
portscan: TCP Portscan 4
portscan: Open Port 19
portscan: TCP Portsweep 75
2.1
1
snort: COMMUNITY SIP
TCP/IP message flooding di-
rected to SIP proxy
107
- - -
rrd threshold: ntop global 4
p0f: New OS 1
p0f: OS Same 2
5
snort: COMMUNITY SIP
TCP/IP message flooding di-
rected to SIP proxy
723
- - -
rrd threshold: ntop global 36
p0f: New OS 4
p0f: OS Same 6
10
snort: COMMUNITY SIP
TCP/IP message flooding di-
rected to SIP proxy
1701
- - -
rrd threshold: ntop global 82
p0f: New OS 6
p0f: OS Same 13
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